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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to investigate citizen views on the free movement of workers within 
the European Union (EU). We are interested in how situational and relational factors affect 
labour market chauvinist attitudes. Drawing on the threat theory, we advance new hypotheses 
on the role of intertemporal relative deprivation in amplifying chauvinist inclinations. From 
the intergroup contact theory and transnational approaches, we borrow insights on the role 
played by cross-border experiences and inclusion in discursive and associational networks in 
containing chauvinism. The analysis uses the original ‘Reconciling Economic and Social 
Europe’ (REScEU) survey conducted in six EU countries (i.e., France, Germany, Italy, 
Poland, Spain and Sweden) in the fall of 2016. The article shows that – though rooted in class 
and status positions – chauvinist attitudes are clearly sensitive to contingent situations and 
lifeworld experiences.  
 
Keywords: Chauvinism; European Union; free movement; immigration; labour market; 
public opinion.  
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Introduction  
In the early 1990s, a brave judge of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), Francis Jacobs, 
stated in a ruling that European Union (EU) law confers to the free movers’ inviolable 
subjective rights to equality of treatment and non-discrimination as ‘human beings, entitled to 
live in any EU Member State in freedom and dignity’ (Jacobs 1992). The ruling came a few 
months after the signature of the Treaty of Maastricht in February 1992, which established EU 
citizenship. Since then, 16 new countries have joined the EU and three new Treaties have 
come into effect: Amsterdam (1999), Nice (2003) and Lisbon (2009). The latter reiterated the 
rights of free movement of persons. However, such rights are now increasingly contested. 
Access to domestic labour markets and social benefits by non-nationals, even if they belong to 
the EU, is visibly under attack (Baute et al. 2018; Kramer et al. 2018). In the wake of rising 
inflows from the newly acceded Member States, segments of political elites and public 
opinions of receiving countries have developed increasing hostility against immigrants, held 
responsible for social dumping dynamics in terms of jobs and wages as well as for ‘benefit 
tourism’ (Heindlmaier and Blauberger 2017; Schmidt et al. 2018). 
This paper aims at investigating individual attitudes towards the intra-EU mobility of 
workers. In particular, we are interested in those pathways that generate support for 
exclusionary practices or ‘labour market chauvinism’ (hereinafter referred to as chauvinism), 
that is, the idea that nationals should have priority in accessing available jobs. Variants of the 
intergroup threat theory postulate that individuals with a socio-economic status that makes 
them more vulnerable are more likely to express anti-immigration attitudes and support 
exclusionary measures (Riek et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012; Mewes and Mau 2012). 
Building on these theories, we make a step forward by analysing the role played by general 
political orientations as well as situational and relational factors often neglected in the 
literature. More precisely, we hypothesise that, controlling for individual socio-economic 
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(‘structural’) positions, right-wing ideological preferences and situations of inter-temporal 
relative deprivation are positively associated with chauvinism. By contrast – in line with the 
intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew 1998; 2016) and transnational approaches (Mau 2010; 
Kuhn 2015) – we expect that citizens who support the EU, travel across European countries, 
share opinions about the EU with others and belong to trade unions are less prone to support 
exclusionary measures. We test our research hypotheses on a sample of six EU Member 
States – France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden – using data from the original 
‘Reconciling Economic and Social Europe’ (REScEU) survey, ‘Citizen views on Solidarity 
and Integration’, conducted in autumn 2016 (Ferrera and Pellegata 2017). Empirical results 
demonstrate that the association between chauvinism and structural positions varies across 
countries, revealing the influence of macro-level features. However, if we isolate micro-
situational and relational factors – keeping structural positions under control – individual 
experiences and contingent situations tend to be strongly associated with chauvinist attitudes. 
 First, our study contributes to the existing literature in both analytical and empirical 
terms. To our knowledge, our work is the first attempt to assess the role played by situational 
and relational factors – intertemporal experiences of economic deprivation, concrete 
experiences of transnational contacts and inclusion in discursive and associational networks – 
on preferences towards worker mobility. Second, we investigate how the relation between 
chauvinism and structural positions, situational and relational factors vary across a sample of 
countries that present different political, economic and social characteristics. Third, our 
original data reveal attitudes after those developments – the great recession and the euro 
crisis, the refugee crisis, terrorist attacks and Brexit – that have dramatically changed the 
European political landscape. 
 The paper is structured as follows. The next section summarises the state of the art. 
The third section presents the general theoretical framework that guides our analyses and 
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generates our research hypotheses. The fourth section describes data and methods, while the 
fifth section discusses our empirical findings. Finally, the last section concludes and draws 
some policy implications. 
External threats and chauvinist attitudes: state of the art 
The view that non-nationals should have ‘less eligibility’ – weaker or no rights of access – to 
the employment opportunities and welfare benefits of the hosting country has been often 
associated with the concept of chauvinism (Kitschelt 1997; Svallfors 2012). Research on 
labour market or welfare chauvinism has mainly drawn on some variant of the ‘intergroup 
threat theory’ (Stephan et al. 2009). According to the latter, the perception of a potential 
‘realistic’ (tangible) or ‘symbolic’ (intangible) harm from outsiders activates negative 
emotions and antagonistic behaviours on the side of individuals or collective actors that 
identify themselves as insiders or ‘ingroup’.  
Realistic threats tend to prompt a utilitarian calculus: immigrants are considered as 
dangerous competitors in a zero-sum game for key but scarce opportunities (jobs) and 
resources (welfare). The anticipation of possible material losses triggers off insecurity, 
frustration, fear or even anger against immigrants and strong preferences for closure. The 
relationship between realistic threats based on resource competition and self-interest, on one 
hand, and chauvinism, on the other, has been investigated by a wealth of empirical studies, 
using a wide variety of designs and measurements. Scholars disagree on the cumulative 
direction of this strand of research, but the overall assessment is that the explanations based 
on self-interest have not fared well so far (e.g., Mewes and Mau 2012; Hainmueller and 
Hopkins 2014; Berg 2015). The main problem seems to lie in contrasting and, at times, 
ambiguous conceptualisations as well as in the difficulty of nailing down empirically actual 
dynamics of zero-sum competition fuelling negative attitudes (Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes 
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2017). 
Symbolic threats affect intangible goods, such as cultural identity, traditions and 
habits, which are upheld by deep and often latent values and emotions. Immigrants are seen as 
a disturbing outgroup and become the target of moral evaluations, negative stereotyping and 
even cultural contempt (Hjort 2016). This leads, in turn, to an inflated sense of moral 
legitimacy of the in-group interests, culture and entitlements and, conversely, the attribution 
of a fictitious homogeneity in terms of (negatively evaluated) cultural traits, motives and 
conduct to the outgroup. The result is an amplification of perceived intergroup differences and 
a greater potential for aggressive and antagonistic behaviours. Symbolic threats activate 
chauvinist attitudes through socio-psychological dynamics involving feelings, emotionally 
charged beliefs and subtle forms of prejudices.  
The literature has identified various pathways that activate such dynamics and has 
highlighted, in particular, the facilitating or triggering role of authoritarian orientations, 
political ideologies and party cues, in the context of ‘symbolic politics’ (McLaren and 
Johnson 2007; Mewes and Mau 2012; Pettigrew 2016). Some scholars have introduced the 
idea of a new ‘integration-demarcation’ divide in Europe, juxtaposing supporters of ‘opening’ 
and intra-EU mobility against supporters of ‘closure’ and anti-immigrant chauvinism. While 
partly linked to self-interest, this new divide rests on cultural fears and symbolic political 
dynamics, linked to right-wing populism (Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012; Teney et al. 2014).  
Overall, the cultural perspective has been more consistently tested and corroborated 
than the resource competition perspective (Houtman 2003; van Oorschot 2007; van der Waal 
et al. 2010; Mewes and Mau 2012; Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012). However, while some 
studies indicate that cultural explanations of chauvinism seem to trump approaches based on 
self-interest (van der Waal et al. 2010), other studies show that there are no empirical reasons 
to disregard economic factors in explaining chauvinism (Mewes and Mau 2012).  
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 In order to move beyond the rather inconclusive contest between economic and 
cultural approaches, a new trend of research has been recently shifting the focus of analysis. 
Mainstream research has primarily concentrated on pathways generating anti-immigrant 
attitudes, captured in aggregate distributions and social categories primarily defined by 
occupation and education within national communities as a whole. However, recent studies 
stress that conventional measures of class, education and income are of limited use in 
understanding the role of risk, insecurity and precariousness and suggest taking into 
consideration not only ‘objective’ conditions but also subjective perceptions and expectations 
(Mewes and Mau 2012; Teney et al. 2014).  
This new research strand also brings into the picture experiential and relational factors. 
Drawing on the intergroup contact theory – originally elaborated by Allport (1954) – what is 
expected is that concrete contacts between individuals and groups have positive effects in 
reducing prejudice, diffidence and antagonism. One key underlying mechanism is named 
‘self-expansion’: interactions encourage people to integrate new things into their own minds 
and lives (Aron et al. 1998). As shown by recent research, this broadening of horizons 
contains negative opinions and fosters more benign attitudes towards outsiders (Dixon 2006; 
Laurence 2014; Pettigrew 2016; Cappelen and Peters 2017).  
In addition, combining contact and network theory, a number of studies have 
highlighted the way in which individual attitudes – including chauvinism – can be shaped and 
reshaped by inclusion in associational and discursive circles (Berg 2009). In a similar vein, 
other authors have shown the importance of ‘transnationalism’ in tempering pro-closure 
preferences (e.g., Kuhn 2015).  
Analysing situational and relational variables that impinge on attitude formation at the 
individual level is a complex task, not least because such variables are not typically observed 
and measured by mainstream surveys. In this paper, we make some steps in this direction by 
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using an original survey that has deliberately tapped into some experiences and situations 
directly lived by respondents. 
Explanatory model and research hypotheses  
Individuals are always located within a social macro-hierarchy of resources, opportunities, 
privileges and powers that shape their objective life chances and subjective orientations. Such 
shaping is not deterministic and takes place in the reality of lived experiences. The inevitable 
influence of class and status is enacted by this micro-situational reality. As aptly suggested by 
Collins (2000: 18), micro-situations are ‘the ground zero of all social action … Nothing has 
reality unless it is manifested in a situation somewhere’. Individuals order the flow of 
everyday life into more or less extended temporal moments in which relationships, 
preferences, emotions, resources and opportunities are organised by attributing to them a 
relatively coherent subjective meaning. Situations are, thus, pervaded by a distinctive 
psychological climate, that is, a mental representation of proximal environments in their 
dynamic and concrete unfolding (Rauthmann et al. 2017).  
While always important from a general theoretical perspective, experiences and 
situations have become ever more salient for attitude formation in the wake of incisive social 
and economic transformations. As a matter of fact, the role played by categorical 
memberships as stable sources of identity has been constantly declining in the last decades; 
the momentum of contemporary life is increasingly grounded in the flow of temporally and 
locally situated proximity contexts. Resting on these broad assumptions, our theoretical 
framework identifies four different sets of explanatory factors that affect the formation of 
chauvinist attitudes. We present them from the more distal to the more proximal ones in 
relation to chauvinist attitudes. 
Structural Positions. These are the traditional background variables prevailing in 
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attitudinal studies. Structural positions are what anchors individuals to the social macro-
hierarchy. Occupation, income, education, gender and age are the typical ‘anchors’, in terms 
of class as well as status. Positions generate structural inequalities and power differentials, 
which, in turn, produce antagonistic potentials in terms of attitudes and behaviours. 
General political orientations. These are the basic traits of people’s political culture 
and have to do with feelings of political trust and efficacy, party identification, core 
ideological leanings, a propensity to be politically active or passive and so on. These types of 
orientations and relations are loosely rooted in positions (through position-specific 
socialisation mechanisms), but – ceteris paribus – may change over time based on 
experiences. General political orientations and relations provide important symbolic, 
emotional, relational and organisational resources for pursuing one’s ends within macro-, 
meso- and micro-societal hierarchies.  
Situations. The conflict potential linked to positions and general political orientations 
and relations is actualised in the context of contingent (i.e., uncertain, often fortuitous) 
situations. These depend on specific features (including mere chance) and events during the 
life cycle. Situations have both an objective dimension (i.e., what actually happens) and a 
subjective one (i.e., how the experience is lived, perceived and evaluated). Situations may be 
lived in isolation but are typically shared with other people. 
Inclusions. Experiential and situational sharing is important because it affects the 
formation of group perceptions, beliefs, emotions, habits and interests. In this respect, 
situations are sensitive to ‘inclusion’ factors: being inserted in associational and discursive 
networks can make a difference, even keeping all previous factors as constant. 
In the context of our topic, the framework works out in the following way. An increase 
of intra-EU mobile workers poses a potential threat. The actual perception of threat is linked, 
in the first place, to structural positions. Here, we rest on the theoretical propositions of 
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mainstream research, according to which threats are greater for low-skilled and low-educated 
people – the so-called ‘losers of globalization’ – who occupy more vulnerable positions in the 
labour market and have lower cognitive skills (Kriesi et al. 2008).  
 
HP1: Low-skilled workers and low-educated people are more prone to express chauvinist 
attitudes (loser hypothesis). 
 
 The threat potential posed by mobile workers is subjectively processed through 
general political orientations, in particular, basic ideological leanings, cultural and social 
openness, support for integration as such (Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012; de Koster et al. 2013). In 
line with the literature, we expect a strong link between, on the one hand, right-wing leanings 
(typically associated with preferences for closure), and low diffuse support for European 
integration (including free movement and non-discrimination principles) and labour market 
chauvinism, on the other hand. Therefore:  
 
HP2a: Controlling for structural positions, right-wing ideological preferences are positively 
associated with chauvinist attitudes (ideological preferences hypothesis). 
HP2b: Controlling for structural positions, support for the integration process is negatively 
associated with chauvinist attitudes (diffuse support hypothesis). 
 
The main novelty that we want to bring into the analysis is a focus on those situational 
and relational dynamics which mould the overall ideational ‘sense’ attributed to material and 
symbolic threats. Here, we focus in particular on three dynamics and factors that are rooted in 
people’s lifeworlds. The first dynamic is the experience of intertemporal relative deprivation – 
a contingent increase of economic hardship – as a potential trigger of chauvinism. Such effect 
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is likely to have increased in the wake of the great recession, which has pushed into relative 
deprivation members of the middle class, who are not in direct competition with migrant 
workers. 
 
HP3: Controlling for structural positions, individuals experiencing a relative intertemporal 
deprivation are more prone to express chauvinist attitudes (relative deprivation hypothesis). 
 
The second factor has to do with the degree of familiarity and of actual interactions 
with outsiders in containing chauvinism (Dixon 2006; Pettigrew 2016). Building on 
transnational approaches, we expect that people who have actually experienced contacts with 
citizens living in other European countries are more likely to support the free movement 
principle and, therefore, less likely to back exclusionary measures against mobile workers. As 
has been aptly argued by Recchi (2015), this group is much larger than the sum of EU-
nationals who find themselves in a given Member State in a particular time, as it also includes 
those who moved in earlier times. In order to better contextualise the general concept of 
‘transnationalism’ for our purposes, we define all those who have taken advantage, at some 
point, of free movement as ‘EU-politans’. 
 
HP4: Controlling for structural positions, individuals with trans-EU experiences are less 
prone to express chauvinist attitudes (EU-politanism hypothesis). 
 
A third factor is the degree to which citizens share their opinions and life experiences 
with others. We expect that people’s inclusion in discursive networks, where the EU and EU-
related matters are debated, might contribute to dilute fear and anxieties about threats. We 
also expect that belonging to a professional or trade union association may help individuals in 
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coping with the challenge of economic competition and orient them towards accepting and 
integrating non-national workers and, thus, contrast the adoption of exclusionary practices 
(Marino et al. 2015). 
 
HP5a: Controlling for structural positions, individuals who are included in discursive 
networks are less prone to express chauvinist attitudes (discursive networks hypothesis). 
HP5b: Controlling for structural positions, trade unions members are less prone to express 
chauvinist attitudes (associational networks hypothesis). 
Data and methods  
We performed our empirical analyses using the 2016 REScEU Mass survey (Ferrera and 
Pellegata 2017). This dataset includes more than 8,000 individual observations collected in 
six EU Member States: France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden.1 These countries 
present important differences that may impinge on both the type and intensity of threats and 
on subjective reactions. They have different labour markets, productive structures and welfare 
states. Some of them have been more severely hit by the crisis (i.e., Italy and Spain) than 
others. There are also important variations for what concerns the presence of right-wing 
populist parties (i.e.,  France, Italy, Poland and Sweden) that campaign on nativist issues and 
exclusionary measures. Finally, the sample countries have experienced different types and 
intensities of migration flows and vary in the share of non-native workers residing on their 
territory. France, Germany and Sweden have long been receiving countries; Italy and Spain 
have only recently turned from emigration to immigration countries, while Poland is the 
largest sending country within the EU.  
The dependent variable used in the empirical analysis is operationalised through a 
survey item that measures individual attitudes towards the access of citizens coming from 
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other EU Member States into national labour markets. The question reads as follows:  
 
According to the EU law, EU citizens are allowed to work in every member state. 
How do you think EU citizens of other nationalities that come to work in our 
country should access the labour market? (1) Freely and individually, just like me 
and my national fellows; (2) As guest workers and only as long as they keep the 
job that let them in [COUNTRY]; (3) [NATIONALITY] workers should have 
priority access to jobs and employment services. 
 
The three response categories contrast the status quo, resting on free movement and ‘non-
discrimination’ (option 1), with a second position resting on a logic of ‘hospitality’ (option 2) 
as well with a third ‘nativist’ position (option 3) (Ferrera 2016). Table A1 in the Appendix 
presents the country-level distributions of responses along the three categories of the 
dependent variable. 
 In five of the six countries, the largest share of respondents opted for a full openness 
of the national labour market (i.e., 49 per cent of the entire sample). As expected, in Poland – 
a country with high outward mobility flows – there is a significant absolute majority in favour 
of openness (59 per cent). Also, in Germany, the absolute majority supports this option (51 
per cent). Given the long-standing tradition of admitting foreign migrants as Gastarbeiter, 
Germany also displays the highest share of respondents in favour of an access conditional to 
the presence of a work contract (27 per cent). In Italy (47 per cent), Spain (49 per cent) and 
Sweden (49 per cent) openness is still supported by a plurality of respondents. There are, 
however, quite sizeable groups in favour of the conditionality option and the chauvinist one. 
France stands out: the relative majority of respondents (45.6 per cent) supported chauvinism. 
In France, the share of pro-openness respondents is the sample’s lowest. 
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We now briefly illustrate the main predictors of welfare chauvinist attitudes, referring 
to the Online Appendix for a more detailed description. Following our theoretical framework, 
we measure structural positions with two main variables: occupational status and education 
level. General political orientations are measured through two scales commonly used by the 
literature. Ideological leanings are captured through respondents’ left-right self-placement. 
Orientations on the new integration-demarcation conflict line (Kriesi et al. 2012) are tapped 
through respondents’ self-placement on a scale delimited by two extremes: ‘integration has 
gone too far’ versus ‘integration should be strengthened’.  
 Situations of inter-temporal relative deprivation are measured through respondents’ 
retrospective evaluation of their household financial situation in the previous five years. We 
operationalise EU-politanism – that is, familiarity with other EU places and contexts – by 
asking respondents if they have ever visited another EU country for work, study or leisure. 
The inclusion in discursive networks builds on an item asking respondents if they speak with 
their relatives and friends about the Euro and other EU-related issues. Inclusion in 
associational networks is captured through trade unions’ membership of respondents or 
another member in the household. 
Given the nominal nature of the dependent variable, we employed multinomial logistic 
regression models with robust standard errors. The first response category of the dependent 
variable (‘freely and immediately’) serves as a reference category. In our analysis, we are 
interested in which factors affect the predicted probability that respondents opted for the 
closure of the labour market by giving priority access to nationals (option 3) instead of a 
complete openness.2 Considering the potential country-level confounders, which would be 
very hard to control for and that the precise definition of some covariates is different across 
countries, we decided to split the sample and run regression analyses separately in each 
country, rather than pooling the data from the six countries. The small number of upper-level 
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units considered in our study – six countries – does not allow us to adopt a multilevel 
modelling technique with random intercepts and random slopes to take into account cross-
country differences appropriately (Maas and Hox 2005). 
Findings 
Tables A2-A7 in the Appendix illustrate the results of our regression analyses of the 
dependent variable – attitudes towards the EU migrant workers’ access to domestic labour 
markets – on the covariates in each sample country. As already said, for reasons of clarity, we 
discuss results for the response category referred to as the chauvinist position: ‘nationals 
should have priority access to the labour market’. According to our analytical model and 
given the interrelations between the independent variables, we have defined six different 
model specifications. Every model tests the association between labour market chauvinism 
and one specific set of independent variables, defined by the hypotheses advanced above. This 
empirical strategy allows us to disentangle the net statistical effect played by each set of 
independent variables, avoiding concerns for multicollinearity and controlling only for 
structural antecedents – age, gender, occupation and education – that might be the source of 
spuriousness. 
Given the non-linear nature of the multinomial logistic models, regression coefficients 
reported in Tables A2-A7 do not provide a meaningful and straightforward interpretation of 
substantive empirical results. To capture the strength and the significance level of the 
association between chauvinism and the key covariates, we computed the predicted 
probabilities of respondents to support exclusionary measures at changing values of the 
different independent variables. Figure 1 displays six graphs – one for each sample country – 
plotting the changes in the predicted probability of labour market chauvinism, according to 
the discrete change in the categories of the variables measuring respondents’ structural 
15 
 
positions. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Plots in Figure 1 show that the association between chauvinism and structural 
positions does not follow the same patterns in the six countries studied. With regard to 
occupation, in France and Germany, those categories that are more vulnerable to the threat 
coming from the competition with other EU workers – service and production workers as well 
as the unemployed – do not show a significantly higher predicted probability to opt for 
exclusionary measures than the salaried middle class. In these two countries, however, the 
likelihood of high-skilled professionals employed in socio-cultural sectors – those who are 
expected to be less vulnerable – to express chauvinism is significantly lower than white 
collars. In the other four countries, by contrast and as expected, individuals more exposed to 
the threat coming from workers of other EU Member States have a higher-predicted 
probability to express chauvinist attitudes.  
Empirical results, however, show important cross-country differences. In Spain and 
Sweden, only service and production workers are significantly more prone to support 
exclusionary measures than white collars; while in Italy and Poland, only the unemployed 
show a significantly higher predicted probability to express chauvinist positions. Interestingly, 
Sweden is the only country in which welfare recipients – pensioners and people receiving 
welfare subsidies – are more prone to support chauvinism than the salaried middle class. This 
may be related to the universalistic character of the Swedish welfare state, which grants to any 
resident access to benefits, regardless of contributions. 
Regarding education, apart for Poland and Sweden, people who have obtained tertiary 
education or more are significantly less prone to express chauvinist attitudes than low-
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educated respondents are.3 In Italy and Spain, also, the ‘upper secondary education’ category 
presents a significantly lower-predicted probability to support labour market closure than the 
‘lower secondary education or less’ category. 
Considering that only in some of the sample countries occupational vulnerability and 
high education are simultaneously and significantly linked to labour market chauvinism, HP1 
finds only partial empirical support in our data. However, we have run a further empirical 
check of HP1. Individual structural vulnerability is determined by a combination of the skills 
linked to their occupation, the strength of the competition with migrant workers given by the 
sector in which they are employed and the cultural capital given by their educational 
attainment. Thus, we have isolated those individuals that, presenting specific characteristics, 
should be more exposed to material and symbolic threats: low educated citizens, unemployed 
or service and production workers occupied in the private sector of three fields particularly 
vulnerable to the competition with migrants (i.e., construction and buildings, transports and 
logistics and retail and wholesale). In Table A8 in the Appendix, we have substituted 
occupation and education with this new dummy variable that measures the exposure to threat 
and we have compared the difference in the predicted probability of expressing chauvinist 
attitudes between exposed and non-exposed citizens, controlling for age and gender. Figure 
A1 (see Appendix) shows that, with the exclusion of Poland, citizens who are more 
vulnerable to the material and symbolic threats generated by the free movement of EU 
workers are significantly more prone to express chauvinist attitudes. 
Models 2-6 in Tables A2-A7 show that in most of the countries variables measuring 
general political orientations, relative intertemporal deprivation, EU-politanism, and inclusion 
in discursive as well as associational networks are strongly and significantly associated to 
chauvinist attitudes. Furthermore, values of the Wald tests, reported at the bottom of these 
models, show that – in most of the cases – models also including orientations or situational or 
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relational factors have the highest goodness of fit to our data than Model 1, including only 
structural positions. Figure 2 plots one graph for each sample country displaying the 
difference in the predicted probability of expressing chauvinist attitudes for a one-unit change 
in the scales measuring left-right preferences and EU support, respectively. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
For both explanatory factors – all else being equal – the relationship between 
chauvinism and general political orientations is significant in all the six countries studied. 
These results lend strong support on both HP2a and HP2b. Moving from left to right on the 
traditional ideological continuum, results in a higher-predicted probability express chauvinist 
attitudes. At the same time, the more a respondent believes that the integration process should 
be strengthened, the lower the predicted probability of labour market chauvinism. In France, 
Germany and Italy, the effect of both variables on chauvinism is particularly strong, while the 
effect is weaker in Poland and Spain. Especially in Poland, this result could be partially 
explained by the high emigration rates of workers. In Sweden, opinions about the integration 
process outperform left-right preferences in terms of the magnitude of the effect on labour 
market chauvinism. These results confirm the important role played by political orientations 
in part already highlighted by the literature (e.g., Karreth et al. 2015). Our analysis adds, 
however, an important specification: political orientations on both the traditional ideological 
spectrum and the new integration-demarcation dimension are strongly associated, not only to 
attitudes towards immigration in general but also to citizens’ opinions on the intra-EU 
mobility of workers. 
The six graphs, plotted in Figure 3, show the difference in the predicted probabilities 
of opting for the chauvinist category of the dependent variable at changing values of the 
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independent variable, measuring respondents’ intertemporal deprivation. Those who have 
declared that their household financial situation stayed about the same, during the previous 
five years, are taken as a reference, and we have computed the difference in the predicted 
probability to express chauvinist attitudes for those who think that their situation got worse 
and for those who believe that it has improved. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
Our results confirm HP3 in four out of six countries. In France, Germany and Italy, 
respondents who have declared that their household financial situation got worse in the 
previous five years present a significantly higher predicted probability of supporting 
exclusionary measures than those who consider their situation as stable. In Sweden, this 
association is statistically significant only at a 90% confidence level, but the opposite 
situation is confirmed: for individuals that have experienced an improvement, the predicted 
probability of expressing chauvinist attitudes is lower than those whose situation stayed about 
the same. In Poland and Spain, instead, the association between relative deprivation and 
chauvinism is not confirmed. A potential explanation for this result could be that the increase 
of economic hardship has affected, in particular, specific categories of individuals in Poland 
and Spain. Thus, occupational classes capture the relationship between chauvinism and 
relative deprivation. In these two countries, in fact, service and production workers or the 
unemployed are significantly more prone to express chauvinist attitudes than the salaried 
middle class.  
Finally, Figure 4 plots three graphs displaying the predicted probabilities of expressing 
chauvinist attitudes at changing values of three dichotomous variables: EU-politanism (left), 
inclusion in discursive networks (centre) and trade unions membership (right). 
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[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
Results reported in the graph on the left of Figure 4 confirm HP4 in four out of six 
countries. In Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden, ‘EU-politanism’ (as defined above) is 
negatively and significantly associated with chauvinism. In these countries, even controlling 
for the effects of structural positions, individuals with ‘EU-politan’ experiences present a 
lower-predicted probability of chauvinism. Conversely, those who have never had such 
experiences are more likely to be chauvinist. The association between EU-politanism and 
chauvinism is particularly strong in Sweden (-15 points), the sample country with the highest 
share of respondents who have visited another EU country (79%). Unfortunately, our survey 
does not allow us to operationalise the concept of EU-politanism in an appropriate way. Kuhn 
(2015) builds a more fine-grained indicator of transnationalism, a concept very close to our 
idea of EU-politanism. By means of this indicator and its different sub-dimensions, Kuhn 
(2015: 94-100) demonstrates that Poland and France are two of the EU Member States that 
show the lowest aggregate levels of transnationalism. This result might contribute to explain 
the lack of significance in the relationship between chauvinism and EU-politanism in these 
two countries. 
Our data confirm HP5a in all the countries analysed (see graph in the centre of Figure 
4). On average, the predicted probability to support exclusionary measures of those who 
usually discuss with relatives and friends about EU-related issues is significantly lower (-6 
points) than the probability of those who do not. Regardless of the country of residence and 
controlling for occupation and education, being included in discursive networks reduces 
chauvinism. 
Finally, the graph on the right of Figure 4 shows that trade union membership contains 
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chauvinist attitudes (HP5b), only in Italy and Spain. In these two countries, irrespective of 
occupation and education, belonging to trade unions is negatively and significantly associated 
to chauvinism. EU trade unions have generally supported worker mobility. Presenting an 
articulated ‘Labour Mobility package’ in 2016, the European Trade Unions Confederation 
(ETUC) stated in clear letters that ‘The ETUC stands for free and fair mobility for all’. 
However, the saliency of mobility issues, the tones of their discourse, the extent to which 
national trade unions engage with the challenge of non-discrimination based on nationality 
varies a lot across countries (Marino et al. 2015). South European trade unions (including, to a 
lesser extent, the French trade unions) is known for its strong pro-immigration stance and its 
discursive and policy activism. The factors that account for the high significance of trade 
union membership in Spain and Italy is rooted in historical features and traditions: a long 
experience with emigration, past experience of transnational mobilisation in defence of their 
own compatriot workers abroad, the ideological tradition of ‘internationalism’ as well as the 
ambition to be general interest organisations and participate in overall policy making 
(Martínez-Lucio et al. 2013). 
Conclusion 
This article has investigated public attitudes towards mobile workers in six countries: France, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden. Drawing on the threat theory, intergroup contact 
theory and transnational perspectives, we have moved beyond the mainstream ‘globalization 
loser hypotheses’ by looking at a number of ‘situational’ and ‘relational’ factors. In particular, 
we have tested, on the one hand, the role of contingent experiences of intertemporal relative 
deprivation in possibly amplifying pro-closure sentiments and, on the other hand, the role of 
cross-border experiences and inclusion in discursive and associational networks in possibly 
containing chauvinism. Our empirical findings have confirmed our hypotheses in most of our 
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countries. 
 Compared to the existing literature, our study highlights important cross-country 
differences for what concerns the antecedents of chauvinism. Country characteristics do affect 
the relationship between chauvinism and socio-economic status, contingent experiences of 
relative deprivation and interpersonal relations. Second, country-level differences impinge, in 
particular, on the association between chauvinism and structural positions. Low skills and low 
education are not associated to chauvinism in all the countries included in our study. Finally, 
orientations, situational and relational factors – our specific and novel focus – are 
significantly associated with chauvinism in most of the countries studied. Controlling for 
structural vulnerability, these factors contribute to explain the (de)activation of chauvinist 
attitudes. Ideological preferences and sharing opinions about the EU with others are 
significant predictors in all the sample countries. ‘EU-politanism’ displays a particularly 
strong negative association with chauvinism. In Southern EU Member States (i.e., Italy and 
Spain), moreover, trade unions’ members are less prone to support exclusionary measures. 
What general implications can be drawn from our findings? Pro-closure attitudes 
constitute an alarming destabilising factor for the integration process. The role played by 
situational and relational factors indicate that the lure of souverainisme can be resisted, 
provided certain contextual conditions obtain. While structural positions are hard to modify, 
experiences and their perceptions are more amenable to the influence of specific anticipatory 
or compensatory measures. In its turn, fostering greater knowledge of the EU as such and its 
Member States (‘EU-politanism’) could reduce anxieties and fears about ‘others’. It remains 
to be seen whether policy makers – especially political leaders – will be willing and able to 
exploit this potential in order to contain pro-closure sentiments and their destabilising effects. 
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Figure 1. Difference in predicted probabilities of preferences for chauvinism at changing 
structural positions by country. 
Notes: Graphs obtained from Model 1 in Tables A2-A7. 95% confidence intervals are 
estimated. Reference categories: DV = freely and individually; Gender = male; Age = 18-34; 
Occupation = salaried middle class; Education = lower secondary or less. Source: REScEU 
Mass Survey. 
 
 
Figure 2. Difference in predicted probabilities of preferences for chauvinism at one-unit 
changes on political orientations scale by country. 
Notes: Graphs obtained from Model 2 in Tables A2-A7. 95% confidence intervals are 
estimated. Reference categories: DV = freely and individually. Source: REScEU Mass 
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Survey. 
 
Figure 3. Difference in predicted probabilities of preferences for chauvinism at changing 
conditions of intertemporal material deprivation by country. 
Notes: Graphs obtained from Model 3 in Tables A2-A7. 95% confidence intervals are 
estimated. Reference categories: DV = freely and individually; Household financial situation 
= stayed about the same. Source: REScEU Mass Survey. 
 
 
Figure 4. Difference in predicted probabilities of preferences for chauvinism at changing 
values of situational/relational factors by country. 
Notes: Left-side graph obtained from Model 4, centre graph obtained from Model 5 and right-
side graph obtained from Model 6. Models are taken from Tables A2-A7. 95% confidence 
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intervals are estimated. Reference categories: DV = freely and individually; EU-politanism = 
never visited another EU country; Discursive networks = no; Trade unions’ member = no. 
Source: REScEU Mass Survey.  
 
                                                     
1 We refer to the Online Appendix for a detailed presentation of the survey.  
2 Although the dependent variable can be considered an ordinal variable, given the peculiar nature of the second 
response category, we prefer to treat it as a nominal one. The second option can be understood as a ‘partial 
opening’ or a ‘partial closure’ on the side of EU workers, depending on whether it is contrasted to the first or to 
the third category. It was included in the survey to appropriately measure attitudes towards free-movement, 
especially in those countries (such as Germany) that experienced this kind of practice in the past, but it is much 
less relevant for the purpose of this study. Thus, although the tables presenting the empirical models also report 
results for the second response category, for the sake of the presentation we do not discuss them in the following 
section. However, even considering the dependent variable as an ordinal variable or dichotomising it by merging 
the second and the third response categories, the main results do not change.  
3 In France, this relationship is significant at p < 0.1. 
